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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with a time dependent game model under the duel type setup.
The new hybrid model of the game theory and the fluctuation process could be
applied for various practical decision making situations. The unique theoretical
stochastic game model is proposed to analyze the two person duel type game in
the time domain. The parameters for the strategic decision including the moments
of crossings, prior crossings and the optimal number of iterations to get the
highest chance for successful shooting are obtained by the compact closed joint
functional. In addition, the paper demonstrates to use the new time based
stochastic game model for analyzing a conventional duel game model in the
distance domain. It also briefly explains to build the strategies into atypical
business case and how it actually works.
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21. INTRODUCTION
A game theory has been applied for various strategic situations and developed to solve
real-world issues more innovatively. A typical duel is an arranged engagement in combat
between two persons, with matched weapons in accordance with agreed upon the rules
under different conditions. The duel game in the paper is such that players are shooting a
target rather than shooting each other. So, each player could choose either to "shoot" or
"wait" for one step closer to the target on his turn (or iteration). In general, a conventional
duel game model accurately describes the conditions in the distance domain and finds
when and who could win the battle even at the beginning. The backward induction
provides a simple solution: regardless of whether you have a better or a worse shoot, the
shooting moment when the sum of the success probabilities passes the threshold is the
most critical . [18] On the other hand, a variant antagonistic stochastic game in real time
between two players A and B has been adapted on the top of a duel game. Unlike
conventional antagonistic stochastic games [4-5][7][12], the players are in a duel game
situation at random times with random impacts. Either player can take the best shoot after
passing a fixed threshold. According to the backward induction, a player has the chance to
take a shoot when its underlying threshold is crossed. Upon that time (referred to as the
first passage time), the player can make the strategic decision [6].
In the stochastic duel model, the actions of players are formalized by marked point
processes to identify the chances for the successful shootings at the certain points in the
time domain. The processes evolve until one of the processes crosses its fixed threshold of
the probability of the success. Once the threshold is reached at some point of time, the
associated player has the highest chance to succeed his shoot. This basic model could be
applied to various business decision making situations even though the rules and
conditions of a basic duel game model are relatively restricted. Various duel type games
have been studied since 1970s [14-15, 18, 20-21] and one of lessons from them is the
decision that matter is when to do rather than what to do [18]. Unfortunately, duel type
games only consider the deterministic turn around (iteration) for shooting by the success
probabilities based on the distance between players.
Atypical marketing strategic decision making based on an antagonistic game could be
applied in the smartphone business. Although there are many smartphone manufacturers,
Apple and Samsung are the most dominant manufacturers in the market. This game is
based on these two companies. Because smartphone technologies are changing rapidly,
devices need to be upgraded, even after they are launched. Strategically, the manufacturers
may have a greater chance of success if they implement more technologies (or features),
but this tactic requires more time spent on research and development. More importantly, a
firm could lose its market share if it launches a product that fails to satisfy customers.
Therefore, its initial product should be appealing enough to dominate the market.
However, at the same time, the firm could also fail if it launches a product too late
compared to its rival. This kind of research has been massively studied in the marketing
area [1][9-10][13][19][23-24] but none of research has studied mathematical approaches.
Although the new mathematical game model in this paper is relatively restricted, this
newly proposed model could apply various business decision making issues, especially
marketing strategic decision for new product launch.
The article presents a versatile stochastic duel game with the complete information which
means both players know the success probabilities in the time domain. Unlike a
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iteration periods and the iteration periods for each round might be different even within the
same player (i.e., stochastic). Lastly, the paper demonstrates the special case of the
stochastic duel game which is based on the deterministic same iteration times for both
players. This special case shows how the time domain duel game model is related with the
distance based duel games.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of a process where the
decision making occurs according to a marked point process in time, with two dimensional
marks presenting the cumulative success probabilities up to the dominant point of
shooting. We derive a joint functional of each component as the process at the first passing
the dominant point and at one step prior. This section also contains practical implications
how to understand this new model properly. In Section 3, the special case of a versatile
stochastic duel game is covered. It deals with the deterministic iteration times of both
players and demonstrates how the stochastic duel game could be applied into a well-
known conventional duel game. It is a relatively simple case but it gives more clear
understanding how this new type of stochastic duel games works. This section also
contains the way of the time domain transform from the distance domain. Section 4
presents the real-world application which this new model applies in the marketing strategy.
The setup is in the smartphone market which has mainly two dominant players. This
section demonstrates how the versatile stochastic duel game could be applied into the real-
world situation before the conclusion in Section 5.
2. A S D GNTAGONISTIC TOCHASTIC UEL AME
The antagonistic duel game of two players (called "A" and "B") are introduced and both
players know the full information regarding the success probabilities based on the time.
Each player has two strategies either "shoot" or "wait" and choose one strategy at the
certain points of time. Let  be a payoff function of player A based on the continues  
time  and  be a payoff function of player B at the time .      A payoff function represents
the reward value at the time of each player such as the benefits of a player. Both functions
are assigned as follows:
                                  2.1max max 
                                     2.2max max 
where  max max and  are the end of the time which gives the maximum payoff of each
player. The values could be implied as the end of the product life cycle when this game is
applied in the marketing strategy decision making problem. The probabilities regarding
hitting an opponent player at  (or ) are considered as follows: 
          
    
           max max
 2.3
Both hitting probabilities are arbitrary incremental continuous functions which reaches 1
when the time  (or ) goes to the allowed maximum .      max It is noted that the
probability of hitting an opponent player becomes 100 % when player A takes a shoot at
 max max (  for player B) which is equivalant with the maximum payoff of player A. The
strategic decision in a duel game means to find the moment when a player will have the
best chance to hit the other. There is a certain point that maximizes the chance for
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of the success in the continuous time domain. This moment  is defined as follows:
              inf     .  2.4
Each player can make the decision at the certain points of the time. Let ( , ( ), ) be a   
probability time space and let   be independent -subalgebras. Suppose        
   a.s. 2.5           

   
   a.s. 2.6           

   
are -measurable and -measurable renewal point processes with the following  
notation:
  2.7                
  
 2.8                
  
The game in the paper is a stochastic process describing the evolution of conflicting
between players A and B based on the perfectly known information (i.e., the success
probabilities of players are known) . Only on the -th epoch , player A could make[22] j 
the decision either for taking a shoot or for waiting until another turn (iteration) . He
will have the best chance to hit the player B exceeds its respective threshold  (or U V for
player B). To further formalize the game, the exit indices are introduced as follows:
  inf j           j       2.9
   inf                   2.10
and  indicates that player A is starting the game first. In the case of the duel games in<
the time domain, the threshold of each player could be converged into one value which
will be introduced later. Player A will have the best chance to succeed for shooting
compare to the failure chance of player B (  and  respectively). Hence,          
player A has the highest success probability of shooting at time , unless player B does
not reach his best shooting chance at time . Thus, the game is ended at  .     min 
However, we are targeting the confined duel game for player A on trace -algebra
                         (i. e., player A in the game obtains the best
chance for shooting first). The first passage time   is the associated time from the
confined game. The functional
       2.11               
                                     1      
of the game will represent the status of both players upon the   and the exit time pre-exit
time  . The latter is of particular interest, because player A wants to predict [2-3][11]
not only his time of the highest chance, but also the moment of the next highest chance
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with (2.12)-(2.19):
 (2.12)     
 (2.13)        
  (2.14)           
  (2.15)              
 (2.16)        
 (2.17)           
 (2.18)              
 (2.19)             
The Laplace-Carson transform is applied as follows:
                 
 
 
               Re  Re 2.20
with the inverse
       

       2.21
where  is the inverse of the bivariate Laplace transform . [2]
Theorem 1. The functional  of the game on trace  -algebra
                         satisfies the following formula:
                   
    
   
  
  
    
     
              2.22
Proof: Introduce the families:
    inf       2.23
    inf .       2.24
Application for  to  will bypass all terms except for       
                     . Thus, applying operator  to random set
                 , we arrive at
                                   2.25
To prove formula (2.25), we first notice that
                                      2.26
Then, iterating the integral of (2.20), we have from (2.25)
6           
 
 
           
 
 
 2.27
which yields (2.25). Denote
                  2.28
Since,
 [ 2.29                       
                                    
where
                               2.30 
then by Fubini's Theorem and due to (2.25) and (2.28)
                        [
                                               
        
      2.31 
 
 
 
 
  

 
 
 
 
where
                                              
                                         

    
                                

         
                                   
and
                 
   

    
   
   
 
 
           
                                     
 
         
 
 
 
 
  


                                     


   
   
 
 

Then, we have
7               
 
 
             
 
 


   
     
 
   
 
 
  

 
                                           
  
 
    
       
 
  

  
Now, :        can be revived when the inverse of the operator  of (2.21) to    
                   
    
   
  
  
    
     
              2.22

The functional   contains all decision making parameters regarding this game. The
information includes the best moments of shooting ( ) and the one step     exit time
before the best moment  (  ) and the optimal number of iterations       pre-exit time
for both players. The information for both players from the closed functional are as
follows:
(for player A)
             2.32            

lim

    
             2.33            



lim    
(for player B)
             2.34           

lim

    
             2.35            



lim    
and
                  
     2.36
It is noted that the best shooting moments of both players may be revised because the
optimal index of each player should be an integer. The versatile stochastic duel game
allows to analyze the game of two conflicted factors in the continues time domain.
Although atypical duel game is limited to the success probabilities of two players based on
the distance between players , the continuous time domain duel game in this research[18]
could be flexible by using any incremental cost functions based on the continuous time
domain.
There are couple of practical implications when we are dealing with this versatile
stochastic duel game: First, the backward induction which is the core of a duel game does
not be changed even in the time based stochastic games. Therefore, the best strategy for
each player is "shoot as soon as that the player cross the point when sum of the success
probability of hitting equals one" . The functional [18]   gives the full analytical
8information to build up the winning strategies for both players. From (2.32)-(2.36), player
A should take a shoot at his -th turn (which means he should wait until the  
iterations). The average duration until player A has the best chance to win becomes . 
Similarly, player B should shoot at his -th iteration and the average duration is .  
Basically, each player will continue their iterations until the accumulated iteration passes
the threshold which is  from (2.4). Second,  because of the backward induction, a player
who has higher chance to win is determined at the beginning of the game. Theoretically
speaking, player A will most likely win the game if  and player B            
could likely win in the opposite case (i.e., ). Thus, player A may have the       
different strategies based on the condition. Of course, player A must take the shoot at his
-th turn and it is straight forward. But the strategy of player A shall beif         
trickier when player B likely wins the game (i.e., )         because it means that
player B will have his best shoot before player A. Even this is the case, player A should
understand that player B still has the chance to fail although player B shoots at the best
moment does not guaranteed for  . In other words, the highest probability of success 
actual success. Because of the above reason, player A should compare the chances not only
at  but also at  to build up a proper strategy. In the adverse condition of player A  
(i.e.,  after player B fails his                 ), player A shall take the shoot at 
shoot at        if player A has higher chance at  compare to (i.e.,   
             ). Otherwise,  player A should take a shoot at the time  
instead of  . the time (i.e., )                 Again, it does not matter
players are better or worse shooting but it is the cumulative success probabilities that
matter.
3. S C D I TPECIAL ASE: ETERMINISTIC TERATION IMES
This section demonstrates the practical case of a versatile stochastic duel game which
considers the deterministic iteration time for each player. As it is mentioned before, the
continuous time domain duel game in this research could be flexible by using any
incremental cost functions based on the continuous time domain. Let us assume that the
optimal moment of a time based duel game is already known as  from (2.1)-(2. ). Since, 
we deals with the deterministic iteration process of each player, the durations of one
iteration for each player are constant values. From (2.7)-(2.8) and (2. ):
                       3.1
where  and  are the fixed iteration duration time of players (  for player A and  for      
player B).
Lemma 1. The functional  based on the fixed iteration duration (3.1) is as follows:
                             3.2
where
              3.3                
 
      
              3.4                
 
      
Proof: from (2.12), let us assign (2.13)-(2.19) as follows:
9            3.5           
            3.6                    
            3.7                                
            3.8           
            3.9                    
            3.10                                
            3.11                                            
Recall the  from (2.22), we haveTheorem 1
                              
   
 
                          

                              
   
 
         
        
    
       
 
  

            3.12   

     
where
                     
  
    
 
     
   
        
      
        
        

                      3.13            
              


      



 
  
  



          
             


     


 
 

  
  

    
From (3.12),
                 
  
   
 
   

 
                        3.14              
  
   
   
 

      
where
            3.15    

     





      
            3.16    

    





     
From (3.13)-(3.16),
                    

  
        
                                   

    
        
where
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                          


                

                                         


    
 
 
 
 
                         


              

                              


 



 
Therefore, we have
                    
    
   



 . 3.2

From (2.32) and (2.34),  ofthe information for both players to get the optimal moment
shooting are as follows:
                     3.17
  3.18            
     
 
 
 
 
 
The actual moment of best shoot may not same as (2.32) and (2.35) because the exit index
of each player should be an integer and this fact also impacts on the  of eachpre-exit time
player:
                
 
     
 
 
 3.19
3.1. Best Strategies for Player A
The best response is the strategies which produce the most favorable outcome for a player
[3]. The best response of player A is the  of shooting  and it responses based onexit index 
the iteration time of player B. Let us assign the function of best response correspondences
for player A as follows:
  
   
        
 
 

. 3.20
As an illustration, we take 35  5 and   As it is mentioned above,             
the iteration process of each player is deterministic and the analysis for the best response
of player A is demonstrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. Best response function of player A
From (3.18) and (3.20), the best response index depends on the iteration duration of player
B when the iteration period of player A is 5. For instant, the  of player A is 10exit index
when the iteration period of player B is 17 (i.e., ). It means that player A should  
take the shoot at 17th iteration to get the highest chance to hit player B. From (3.18), the
exit time of player A gives the best hitting chance and the hitting probability of player A is
    from (2.1) and (2.3).
3.2. Reconstructing A Conventional Duel Game
The distance based conventional duel game is a special case of the versatile stochastic duel
game under the deterministic iteration time condition. This section demonstrates how the
duel game in the time domain could be adapted to analyze a conventional duel game. As it
has been mentioned in the previous section, the conventional duel game is adapted from
Polak . Let us consider the duel game which has the following rules:[18]
1. Each player (player A, B) has a gun with single bullet and player A starts the game
2  and  they are facing each other with the distance of   ;     
3. let  be the probability of player A hitting player B if player A shoots at distance ;   
4. let  be the player B's probability of hitting player A if player B shoots at distance ;   
5. the probability of hitting for each player is give as follows:
                   
  
        3.21
6. players alternatively have the chance to make the decision;
7. either "shoot" or "one step   forward";    
8. Every turn makes every    closer each other if both players are moving     
forward instead of shooting;
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9. the hitting probabilities of both players are known (i.e., perfect information).
According to the above rules, the illustration of the hitting probabilities of both players is
shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Probability of hitting for both players
The first shoot should occur after which means that no one should before  but there is  
a dominance at . As it is mentioned on the rule, player A knows the next move of player  
B [7]. Whoever gets the first turn after  will be the winner of the game and The value   
is determined by their join ability as follows:
                inf     .  3.22
From (3.22) and the above given game rules,    yields  and player A have the 
more chance to win this game if player A shoots at his 5-th turn. It is noted that who shoots
first is not necessarily better or worse shooter . This typical duel problem could be[18]
solvable by transforming the distance domain to the time domain. Let us assume that the
speed of "moving forward"  is   which is a constant value. All variables in the   
distance domain are easily transformed in the time domain (see Table I).
Table I. Time domain transform of a classic duel game
Distance Domain Deterministic Time Domain
        
    
       
         

  
  
  
   
   
   
 
max
max




 
  
          
           
 


 

 
 
 
    
   
 
The time domain transforms of the hitting probabilities are illustrated in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Probability of hitting in the distance and the time domain
As it is illustrated in Fig. 3, the hitting probabilities in both domains are same but the input
variable has been changed to time (seconds) from distance (meters). Once the distance
domain is mapping in the time domain, we could find the best response  from   
(3.21) which could be graphically demonstrated in Fig. 4.
Fig 4. Best response function of player A in the conventional duel game
The best responses function of player A shows all iteration time range of player B and the
best strategy of player A in this duel game is shooting at 5-th iteration moment where
    (i.e., the downward-pointing triangle in Fig. 4).
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4. C P N P L SASE RACTICE: EW RODUCT AUNCHING TRATEGY
This section demonstrates the practical application of this research for developing
marketing strategy. The case practice shows how stochastic duel games could be applied.
The numbers and names are fictional but realistic for this demonstration. In this case
practice, there are two major smartphone companies that share the market. Let us make
some stories regarding the above situation: Samsung just finished developing its flagship
smartphone for this year. Samsung should decide to either "Launch" the smartphone, or
"Wait" for running an additional development cycle to add new features. One development
cycle takes approximately 6 months. Once the development cycle is started, they cannot
launch the product until it is completed. In other words, Samsung must wait 6 months for
his next opportunity to make another decision once he chooses to "Wait." Samsung knows
that Apple will complete its flagship smartphone 5 months later, and its development cycle
to add new features will finish 4 months after it launches the first product. Since both
companies have ample experience in the smartphone industry, they know the probability of
success for either choice. Samsung wants to know the best time to launch his new flagship
smartphone. If Samsung launches its smartphone too early, consumers would not choose it
because it does not have enough attractive, new technologies. However, Samsung may lose
the game in the market if Apple launches its flagship device before Samsung launches.
Overall, who has the greater chance to win this game? This versatile duel game could be
easily demonstrated to get the answer of this question. It is noted that the purpose of this
section is designed only for showing how the mathematical model could be applied in the
marketing decision problem. This section only provides the condensed results without
detailed calculations. The development cycles of both companies are assumed to be
exponentially distributed, as determined in the previous section. The parameters based on
the current scenario are as follows:
 
Initial development cycle of Samsung
Development cycle of Samsung
Initial de
Parameter Value Description
 
  

 

   
  
 
  
  
  velopment cycle of Apple (after Samsung)
Development cycle of Apple   
[  Intial setup values for the case practice]Table 1.
It is noted that some parameters of this setup, including the development cycles, are not
carefully evaluated, but are realistic because these are chosen based on information from
experts in the smartphone industry. Once all the parameters are mapped, we can get the
decision parameters from the simulated results.
Parameters Values Descriptions
 

 Best moment that whoever player win the game
Number of development cycle that is best for    Samsung
Best time to launch the product for Samsung
Number of development cycle that is best for Apple
Best tim

 

 
 
 
 

 

 e to launch the product for Apple
[  Decision making results]Table 2.
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According to the simulated results, after passing the moment , Samsung has the
opportunity to launch its product before Apple launches their product. But, Samsung
should run at least 3 development cycles to create new features before launching (i.e.,
    ) after their first commercially ready product is to be launched . If both 
companies launch their flagship smartphone before 18 months , customers would  
not buy their products because they lack attractive features. In this game, the process of
backward induction shows that Samsung is mostly likely to win because the moment
where Samsung shoots  is closer to the threshold  than what Apple has (i. e.,    
      ). From the perspective of Apple, in this particular scenario, releasing the
smartphone on  is no longer the optimal strategy because Apple knows that Samsung
will win this game when it launches its device at  . Therefore, it might be better that
Apple takes the risk to launch the product at  ( 17 months) instead of  ( 21    
months). Probabilistically, Apple will likely lose this game, but the solution to the game is
not deterministic. A player with a higher probability of success is not guaranteed to win
the game.
5. CONCLUSION
The new type of an antagonistic stochastic duel game has been studied. In this versatile
stochastic duel game, both players could have random iterations in the time domain. A
joint functional of the process has been constructed to analyze the information of decision
making parameters which give the best chance to win the time domain game of each
player. Compact closed forms for Laplace-Carson transforms of named functional have
been obtained. Basically, the paper provides the hybrid stochastic model of the game
theory and the fluctuation process which is more flexible to apply duel type game
problems more effectively. The analytical approach is fully supported to understand the
core of a versatile stochastic duel game by applying this model to a conventional duel
game as a special case. Furthermore, the actual application of this new model has been
demonstrated to support the direct implementation of a versatile stochastic duel game into
real-world decision making situations in the smartphone market.
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